A new method for automating political-military games as a means of analyzing strategic forces was recently developed and demonstrated by The Rand Corporation. Interest in this technique sprang from dissatisfaction with the dominant methods of analyzing strategic forces: manual political-military games and force exchange models. While each brings important capabilities to the analysis of strategic forces, neither method can indel~endently handle all of the variables required to satisfy the current demands placed on strategic analysis. Rand drew upon the discipline used to develop models and the flexibility inherent in gaming to develop its automated wargame. The method promises significant improvement over the traditional methods of strategic analysis in breadth of input and flexibility of application.
Introduction
This article presents a conceptual overview of a new approach to political-military wargaming which was sought by the Defense Department to improve upon the conventional methods of analyzing strategic forces. Developed at The Rand Corporation during a nine-month demonstration phase, the approach automates all features of political-military gaming from the force calculations to the decisionmaking participants in the traditional wargame. Machine-controlled players were developed so that the reasons for their actions could be made explicit and reproducible and thereby subjected to debate and systematic analysis.
The ingredients in Rand's approach, bomputer models and wargames, are not new. How they were combined is. The point of departure for this new approach was the traditional political-military game, but in the process of replacing the players and referees with computer models, the traditional structure was modified, resulting in the 0032 2687/82/0000 0000/$02.75 9 1982 Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company introduction of new players and a completely new framework for the analysis of conflict and military forces.
What follows outlines the motivations that led to this approach, the technical challenges it posed, the process of developing and demonstrating the approach, and where it may lead the strategic community in the future. It is based entirely on the experiences accrued during the demonstration phase of the project which concluded in January 1981. The project is now in its second phase.
Background
In 1979, at the instigation of the Director for Net Assessment, the Department of Defense solicited proposals for development of improved methodological frameworks to analyze strategic forces. The ultimate objective was to develop a methodology that could be transferred to the government for use by a variety of agencies with diverse interests and purposes. The consortium of potential users included those concerned with net assessment of military forces, program analysis, and operational planning, each requiring different capabilities from the methodology. For example, some might want to use the methodology to explore the effects of various scenarios or adversary perceptions on different measures of the strategic balance, while others might want to examine the effects of different operational plans or force characteristics on war outcomes. Thus, the requested improvements were aimed at a broad enrichment of the analysis of conflicts with respect to a variety of scenarios and their evolutions, adversarial and allied perceptions of political behavior, and the range of military forces that might play in a given conflict.
The motivation for developing improved methods for the analysis of strategic forces can be found in the familiar complaints about much of military analysis: -It is often limited to the direct effects of engaged forces, without consideration of the interrelated effects of other deployed forces or supporting elements that might be applied to or bear indirectly upon the conflict.
It is generally limited to canonical scenarios, isolated situations that represent thin slices in time, with little regard for antecedent causes or long-term consequences that may influence the conduct of the conflict. -It frequently presumes symmetrical perspectives for adversary (and allied) objectives, force employment plans, doctrine, and tactics. Many of these criticisms might be attributable to limitations inherent in the models used for the analysis of military forces in conflicts [1] . But limitations aside, the advantages of current analytic models of strategic conflict are considerable. Assumptions are usually explicit or explicable, particularly in the simpler models. Cause and effects, and relationships, are either defined or can be determined. Results can usually be independently reproduced and verified. These characteristics have helped to make computer models the principal analytical tool for the description, evaluation, and communication of strategic force exchange outcomes.
